While testing malware recently, we got some logs from our automated analysis system showing a few samples that are only partially replicated. We have heuristics that predict the behavior of a sample; but if that prediction fails, then the heuristics identify the state of a sample and decide if it is worth sending to our Read more…
While working on the release of the latest version of the McAfee Network Security Platform, which offers advanced malware and botnet protection, we tested a sample of the malware Red October. With the help of our in-house advanced botnet analysis framework, we analyzed the network traffic generated by this sample and tracked its communications with the Read more…
It’s a common misconception that mobile malware is a problem limited to users in a particular geographical region such as China or Eastern Europe. Last week, McAfee Labs mobile research department received a mobile malware sample that targets Android mobile phone users in South Korea. The sample pretends to be a popular coffee shop coupon Read more…
McAfee publie aujourd’hui son dernier rapport trimestriel sur les menaces informatiques (McAfee Threats Report: Fourth Quarter 2012) dans lequel le McAfee Labs révèle que les attaques sophistiquées ciblant à l’origine le secteur de la finance sont de plus en plus dirigées vers d’autres secteurs clés de l’industrie, tandis qu’une nouvelle série de tactiques et de nouvelles Read more…
As promised in our previous blog entry for the recent Adobe Reader PDF zero-day attack, we now offer more technical details on this Reader “sandbox-escape” plan. In order to help readers understand what’s going on there, we first need to provide some background. Adobe Reader’s Sandbox Architecture The Adobe Reader sandbox consists of two processes: Read more…
Recently we experimented with our generic unpacking heuristics. Our goal was to unpack a potentially malicious binary and dump the executable from memory to a file. During our experiments we saw a few unknown packers from which we successfully unpacked the binary; with these, however, we dumped the memory but we missed some code in Read more…
Recently we have seen a spike in a Visual Basic 6-compiled AutoRun worm family. The family is both client- and server-side polymorphic. (For more on this family, refer to our VIL and Advisory entries.) The W32/Autorun.worm.aaeh family usually gets on a victim’s machine through email spam, Blacole drive-by downloads, or downloads by BackDoor-FJW. From a behavioral Read more…